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This paper studies the relationship between creditor protection and credit 
volatility. During the negative phase of the business cycle, credit contracts more 
in countries with poor creditor protection. For similar shocks to business 
conditions, credit is more volatile in countries where creditors are de facto weakly 
protected. We test this idea using a dataset on legal determinants of finance in a 
panel of data of aggregate credit growth for a sample of 139 countries during the 
period 1990-2003. We find support for the view that better legal protections 
significantly reduce the impact of exogenous shocks on credit. The results are 
statistically and economically significant and robust to alternative measures of 
creditor protection, the inclusion of variables that reflect different stages of 
economic development and the restriction of our sample to only developing 
countries. 
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  31. Introduction 
 
A well-documented feature in recent literature on law and finance is that strong institutions are 
crucial in fostering the development of financial markets. An institutional set-up that protects 
creditor rights is needed to align the incentives of debtors with those of lenders, increase the 
expected payoffs of lending, and hence achieve deep financial markets.
2  A less documented 
feature is that a strong institutional setup can also reduce the volatility of credit. Documenting 
and explaining this last feature is the main purpose of this paper. 
There is a long tradition in macroeconomics, beginning with Fisher and Keynes, which 
emphasizes the role of credit markets in the propagation of cyclical fluctuations. However, to our 
knowledge, there is little research on the role of protecting creditor rights in propagating shocks 
into financial markets.
3 This paper closes this gap by exploring theoretically and empirically the 
relationship between creditor protections and the credit cycle. 
Figure 1 summarizes some basic findings of previous research on creditor rights and 
financial markets and serves as motivation for our research. Panel (a) shows how the 
development of credit markets (as measured by the ratio of credit to the private sector supplied 
by the financial sector to GDP) is strongly related to commonly used measures of creditor rights 
protection. On average, the size of credit markets is 3 times larger in countries where creditor 
rights are protected.  In countries with weak creditor rights, the ratio of credit to GDP averages 
only 22 percent, as opposed to countries with weak creditor rights, where the same figure 
averages 66 percent.
4 Alternatively, in countries with a common law legal origin, which are 
characterized by strong creditor protection, the ratio of credit to GDP averages 51 percent of 
GDP, as compared to only 38 percent in countries with different legal origin.
5 
Figure 1 also shows that, besides being an important factor in explaining the breadth of 
credit markets, creditor protection is also important in explaining its volatility. Panel (b) of figure 
1 shows that the volatility of credit (measured as the standard deviation of the annual real growth 
                                                 
2 This idea has been formalized by Townsend (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998). 
Recent papers by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997 and 1998) and Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer (2004) have provided new data that has allowed authors to identify empirically, the importance of 
institutions for the development of private financial markets. 
3 See Braun and Larrain (2003) for a discussion. 
4 Similar findings appear when analyzing the median country rather than the average. 
5 Formal empirical results based on these data confirm the finding that countries with poor creditor protection tend 
to have narrower debt and equity markets. See Inter-American Development Bank (2004) for a review and further 
empirical evidence following these lines. 
  4rate of credit) is smaller in countries with stronger creditor protection. In the average country 
with poor creditor rights the standard deviation of the annual real growth rate of credit is 16 
percent, significantly higher than in countries with strong creditor rights (12 percent). This is also 
true when splitting the sample according to country's legal origins. When comparing median 
values of credit volatility, the striking fact is that credit volatility is nearly twice as large in 
countries with poor institutions. 
We develop a theoretical framework based on Holstrom and Tirole’s model of moral 
hazard in credit markets in which creditor protection is explicitly modeled. Using this 
framework, we explain the negative relationship between protecting creditor rights and credit 
volatility shown by the data. The main intuition of the model is that weak creditor protection 
becomes relevant during bankruptcy. When debtors are successful (that is, when their investment 
project has a positive outcome) they repay their debts, but if they fail creditors collect only a 
fraction of the residual value of the project financed. This fraction increases with creditor rights 
and contract enforcement. Therefore, during recessions, when the likelihood of bankruptcy is 
high, the expected pledgeable income of firms falls more in countries with low creditor 
protection, and in response credit is tightened more during these periods, increasing credit 
growth volatility. 
In our empirical analysis we corroborate these ideas. Using a panel data of aggregate 
credit growth for a sample of 139 countries during the period 1990-2003, we find support for the 
claim that better legal protections significantly reduce credit volatility. In particular, we show 
that the impact of exogenous shocks to credit markets is larger in countries with poor creditor 
protection. In common law countries, which are characterized by high creditor protection and 
good contract enforcement, the elasticity of credit with respect to external shocks is half that 
observed elsewhere. In our sample, an improvement of one standard deviation in either creditor 
rights or contract enforcement measures reduces credit sensitivity to external shocks by a third. 
These results are robust to alternative measures of creditor protection, the inclusion of variables 
that reflect different stages of economic development, the restriction of our sample to only 
developing countries, and alternative measures of shocks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and 
motivates our hypothesis. Section 3 presents a simple model to organize the discussion. In 
particular we extend the well-known Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998) model to capture the 
  5links between creditor protection, credit market breadth and the credit cycle. Section 4 describes 
the data set used to test the implications of our basic hypothesis. Section 5 presents empirical 
evidence about the role of legal protections in explaining credit volatility. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Motivation 
 
Our paper is a natural extension of previous works on creditor protection and financial 
development. According to this literature, the power of creditors is a crucial determinant of the 
amount of credit extended by the financial to firms and individuals. Rules and regulations that 
protect creditors rights in financial contracts (for example regulations that clearly state the right 
of creditors to seize collateral in a timely manner if the debtor defaults) and that are properly and 
efficiently enforced increase the power of creditors and therefore lead to larger credit markets. 
This idea has been formalized by Townsend (1979), using a costly state verification model, and 
by Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) using an incomplete contract 
approach. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997 and 1998), Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, (2003), and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2004) test this idea studying the 
cross-country correlation between creditor protection and the size of credit markets, proxied by 
the amount of credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. Using a different empirical 
approach, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2003, 2004), and Galindo and Micco (2004) test this idea studying the firm cross-section 
implication of creditor protection. Weak creditor power has a larger detrimental effect on firms 
more likely to be credit constrained by financial frictions, such as small firms. 
This paper moves one step ahead, focusing on the effect of creditor protection, not on 
credit access (first moment), but on its effect on aggregate credit volatility (second moment). To 
our knowledge, there has been little research on the role of creditor protections in propagating 
shocks into credit markets. The few empirical papers that study related issues focus on the effect 
of financial imperfections on either investment or output behavior. For example, using data on 
large listed firms around the world, Love (2003) shows that firm investment in countries with 
low levels of creditor protections reacts more to cash flows. Using a difference-in-difference 
approach and data for several manufacturing industries in countries around the world, Braun and 
Larrain (2003) show that the greater an industry’s dependence on external finance the higher its 
output volatility. The observed difference in the behavior of industries is greater when financial 
  6frictions (for example, lack of accounting standards) are more prevalent. Besides the fact that 
these studies do not directly analyze the main focus of this paper, the role of legal protections in 
credit volatility, their results cannot be easily extrapolated to the whole economy either because 
of data limitations (large listed firms in the case of Love, 2003) or because of the methodology 
used a difference-in-difference approach in the case of Braun and Larrain (2003).
6 
In a related paper, Johnson et al. (2000) present evidence that the weakness of legal 
institutions plays an important role in explaining the extent of depreciation and stock market 
decline in the Asian crisis (1997-1998). Even though their work mainly focuses on minority 
shareholders’ expropriation by managers and not on private credit, this study is similar to ours 
because it suggests that corporate governance matters a great deal for the extent of macro 
variables’ fluctuation during a shock. Our paper can be viewed as a complement to the work of 
Johnson et al. (2000) that uses wider country coverage and focuses on credit markets rather than 
on equity markets. 
In addition, our paper is also closely related with the credit channel literature. In this 
literature, the financial sector, due to financial frictions, is a propagation mechanism of primitive 
shocks, such as monetary disturbances, preference, or terms of trade shocks. This literature has 
two branches. The first studies the balance sheet effect and focuses on the creditworthiness of 
firms. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), for example, study how credit constraints interact with 
aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. Using a dynamic setup in which lenders 
cannot force borrowers to repay unless their debts are secured, these authors find that the 
interaction between credit limits (collateral) and asset prices turns out to be an important 
transmission and amplifier mechanism for exogenous shocks to credit and output.
7 Using a 
different approach, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) develop a dynamic general 
equilibrium model, which exhibits a financial accelerator. In their setup entrepreneurs are 
financially constrained and have to borrow from a financial intermediary. To motivate a 
nontrivial role for the financial sector, they assume a costly state verification approach. This 
auditing cost, which is proportional to debt, is paid only in case of default and therefore is 
                                                 
6 A difference in difference approach allows to study which sectors or firms are more affected by a given factor, a 
cross derivate effect, but does not allow to determine, unless we do some strong assumptions, the main effect 
(aggregate impact). 
7 In this model, legal creditor protections could be introduced by assuming that the fraction of the market value of 
asset up to which the entrepreneur can borrow is an increasing function of the legal environment. 
  7interpretable as a bankruptcy cost. Using this setup, the paper finds that bankruptcy costs amplify 
the effect of exogenous shocks on both investment (which is related to credit) and output.
8 
The empirical studies in this area are concentrated in the firm cross-section implications 
of this channel. The literature shows that shocks have a large impact on firms more likely to be 
credit constrained by financial frictions (for example, small as opposed to large firms). These 
studies focus mainly on the United States and a few developed countries and do not focus on the 
role of legal protections.
9 
The second branch of models in the credit channel literature, which is less related with 
our paper, studies more specifically the role of banks (the bank lending channel). A negative 
shock affects the ability of banks to provide funds and therefore decreases real activity 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Stein, 1998). The basic hypothesis is that, due to capital market 
imperfections, financially constrained banks may not be able to freely substitute away a shock to, 
for example deposits, with other forms of funding. In consequence, they may optimally cut 
lending in response to a negative shock to deposits, affecting the availability of funds to bank-
dependent firms. Tests of this hypothesis look for systematic differences in the response of loan 
growth to monetary conditions across banks facing different degrees of financial constraints, 
usually proxied by size, asset liquidity, and capitalization. 
In a seminal paper focusing on credit markets, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) develop an 
incentive model of financial intermediation in which, due to moral hazard problems, firms as 
well as banks are capital constrained. In this model, firms’ and banks’ wealth determines their 
debt capacity. The novelty of this paper is that in a simple framework it is able to study demand 
factors (changes in the collateral level of firms) and supply factors (changes in banks’ capital), 
and therefore it can identify a separate balance sheet channel and a lending channel. To motivate 
our empirical section, in the next section we extend the demand side of this model to explicitly 
account for creditor rights and contract enforceability and see how those affect credit volatility. 
 
                                                 
8 In this model, an improvement of legal and effective protections can be thought as a reduction in bankruptcy costs. 
9 This literature shows differential effects of shocks on employment (Sharpe, 1994), investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, 
and Petersen, 1988, and Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996), inventories (Kashyap, Lamont and Stein, 1994), sales, and 
short-term debt (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996, and Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). 
  83. A Model of Creditor Protection and Credit Volatility 
 
We assume the now standard idea that it is difficult for a lender to enforce the level of 
entrepreneurial effort. This setup introduces the type of moral hazard used in the formulation in 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998). Broadly speaking, we assume that there are two kinds of 
risk-neutral agents: borrowers that face profitable investment opportunities but do not have 
enough cash to finance their own projects, and banks that have plenty of cash but no investment 
opportunities. 
The representative entrepreneur faces an investment opportunity at date  t   that returns   o
R  per unit of investment at date  t   in case of success and   1 L  in case of failure ( L  is therefore 
the residual value per unit of investment). However, the project is subject to moral hazard. The 
probability of success (  ) depends on the entrepreneur’s effort. When the entrepreneur does not 
behave in terms of the level of effort, the probability of success is reduced from    to    . 
Due to this lack of effort the entrepreneur obtains a private benefit of  
 e
B  0  per unit of 
investment, regardless of the outcome of the project. We assume that the net present value of the 
project is negative in case the entrepreneur shirks (low effort and therefore lower probability of 
success).
10 In this setup the business cycle is defined as changes in   :  recession times are 
defined as periods of low probability of success. 
Now, we turn to describe the kind of contract that can be written and enforced. Let  I  
denote the amount of investment required by the borrower to undertake his investment project, 
and suppose that a bank is willing to lend  C  I  W  , where  W  denotes the amount of wealth 
that the entrepreneur puts into the project. In case of success, the borrower pays the lender  RB  
per unit of investment; in case of failure, she pays him nothing. However, when the project fails, 
an outcome that we interpret here as bankruptcy, the residual investment  IL  is liquidated. Due 
to problems in the bankruptcy procedure the residual value of this investment is only  IL . 
Lower    implies higher bankruptcy costs. Due to legal restrictions, only a fraction  x  of this 
residual value ends up in the hands of the lender, the borrower keeps the rest ( 1  x ). In this 
set-up    and  x  are measures of creditor protection. Note that    and  x  are conceptually 
  9different.    represents the loss due to inefficiencies in the bankruptcy procedure (e.g., days to 
enforce the law), while  x  represents the way the pie is split between the different parties 
involved in the credit contract after bankruptcy (e.g., if management does not retain 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization). In this set-up creditor 
protection has two dimensions: the social cost of bankruptcy (e.g., resources and time spent 
during the bankruptcy process -  ) and the way the residual investment is divided between 
lenders and the entrepreneur after a bankruptcy procedure ( x ). Higher social bankruptcy costs 
and a lower share of the residual investment going to creditors, are understood as lower creditor 
protection. 
Banks have a zero cost of funding, and the banking industry is competitive (banks break 
even in equilibrium). To focus on the interesting case in which entrepreneurs go bankrupt in case 
the project fails, we impose parameter conditions in which, in equilibrium, banks always charge 
a positive lending interest rate. We also make an assumption that will guarantee that the 
equilibrium investment is finite ( R B
e   x  L  1 ). 
Next we solve for the amount of credit in equilibrium and then we compute the elasticity 
of credit with respect to the cycle and how it varies for different level of creditor protection. 
Conditional on    and using the assumption that the net present value of the project is negative 
when effort is low, entrepreneurs solve the following problem: 
 
Max R RB  1  1  xL  W
st
IC : eIR RB  1  xIL  IB
BP : IRB  1  xIL  I  W  C  
 
Where  IC  is the incentive compatibility constraint, and BP is the creditor’s (or bank’s) 
participation constraint. On the one hand, an improvement in  x  relaxes the incentive constraint, 
although an improvement in the bankruptcy procedure (  ) reduces the entrepreneurs’ incentive 
to work. If the entrepreneur gets a fraction of the residual value of the project in case of 
bankruptcy ( x  1 ), an improvement in the bankruptcy procedure    increases the 
                                                                                                                                                             
10These are standard assumptions in this literature. 
  10entrepreneur’s payoff in case of failure and therefore reduces her incentive to work. On the other 
hand, any type of improvement in credit protection ( x  or     relaxes the bank’s participation 
constraint. 

Banks are competitive, therefore in equilibrium they break even (that is the bank's 
participation constraint is binding). In addition, as profits are linear in  I , in equilibrium the 
entrepreneur's  IC  is bidding too, therefore: 
 
I  W 1
1  R B
e   x  L
  (1) 
 
This condition implies that investment is proportional to the level of the entrepreneur’s wealth. 
The second term in the expression is known in the corporate finance literature as the equity 
multiplier. This multiplier is positively related with the pledgeable income per unit of investment 
( R B
e   x  L ). The equity multiplier increases with our measures of legal creditor 
protection  x.   The multiplier is also increasing in the efficiency of the bankruptcy procedure 
(), if there is a minimum amount of legal protection     For a low level of legal 
protection  
x  .
  , the positive effect of   x     on the residual value of the project (reflected in 
the BP) cannot compensate the negative effect on the entrepreneur's incentive to work. There is 
empirical evidence that shows that a better bankruptcy procedure increases firms’ leverage; as 
the next equation shows, this evidence implies for our model that  x   .
11 We hereafter assume  
x   . Finally, as expected, the pledgeable income and therefore the multiplier decreases with 
the severity of the moral hazard problem ( B ) and increasing in the probability of success    
(that captures the business cycle). From the previous equation we can derive the equilibrium 
amount of credit and leverage level: 
 
C  I  W  W
R B
e   x  L
1  R B




e   x  L
 (2) 
                                                 
11See Djankov et al (2004). 
  11 
The previous equations imply that the debt and leverage levels are lower during recessions 
(lower     Equation (2) also shows that the higher the severity of the moral hazard problem 
(large  
.
B ) the lower will leverage be in equilibrium.
12 The opposite occurs with the degree of 
creditor protection. Higher creditor protection, x  and    (with  x   ), leads to more credit. 
The detrimental effect of lack of creditor protection is increasing with the probability of failure. 
Bad institutions hurt in case of failure (during bankruptcy procedures).
13 Finally, due to the 
constant return assumption, credit is linear with the entrepreneur’s wealth; therefore the total 
amount of credit does not depend on the distribution of wealth among entrepreneurs. 
To study the effect of creditor protection on credit volatility over the cycle we compute 






e  L  xL
1
1  R B





I 1  C
I (3) 
 
The elasticity is positive; during booms the amount of credit in the economy is larger than during 
recessions. Equation 3 also shows that the size of     is related with two factors. The first is 
the fraction of the expected pledgeable income ( 
C,
R B
e  L  xL ) that depends on the 
probability of success of the project ( R B
e  L ). The smaller the stochastic component 
of pledgeable income, the lower the sensitivity of credit. In the limit, if the pledgeable income 
does not depend on the stochastic component of the outcome, credit should not be affected by the 
probability of success (given a constant expected value). This fraction of the stochastic 
component of the pledgeable income is negatively related with creditor protections ( x  and   ). 
                                                 
12By assumption the leverage level     is lower than one.  C/I
13The entrepreneur's profit is: 
W  R 1  L  1 1
1  R B
e   x  L
W
 
  12The second term in     is the equity multiplier; namely the fraction of entrepreneur’s wealth in 
investment. As expected, a large multiplier is related with a large elasticity (sensitivity). The 
total non-stochastic pledgeable income ( 
C,
xLI ), as well as the total pledgeable income, depends 
on total investment ( I ) which is the sum of the entrepreneur’s wealth ( W ) and credit ( C ). 
Therefore for a given level of investment ( I ), the smaller  W   the smaller the fraction of   , C  
that would be repaid with the non-stochastic pledgeable income.
14 As mentioned above, the 
equity multiplier is increasing in creditor protection. Therefore, creditor protection increases 
credit sensitivity to the cycle (  ) through its (increasing) effect on the equity multiplier, but 
reduces this sensitivity through its (decreasing) effect on the fraction of pledgeable income that 
depends on the stochastic component of the project's outcome. To study which effect dominates, 
we take the derivative of the credit-probability of success elasticity (    with respect to   C, x  




















  1  2C
I
C,x   L
  (5) 
 
Equation (4) shows that legal creditor protection ( x ) reduces credit sensitivity as long as the 
leverage level ( C/I ) is small (lower than  1/  ).
15 For an equity multiplier (  2 1/  ) lower  1  C/I
                                                 
14On the one hand, if the fraction of entrepreneur's wealth on investment were ( 1  xL ) the debt would be 
completely paid with non-stochastic pledgeable income and therefore it would be paid with probability one. On the 
other hand, if the share of entrepreneur's wealth on investment were  0,   only a fraction  xL  of debt would be 
paid with the non-stochastic pledgeable income. 
15Using aggregate data, we can compute  C/I,   as the ratio of the stock of credit and total capital (the stock of credit 
is credit to the private sector over GDP and is divided by the capital-output ratio). From the law of motion of 
aggregate capital and assuming a 10% depreciation and a 30% investment-output ratio, the capital-output ratio is 3. 
Using the mean credit-GDP ratio in our sample (40 percent), we have that our variable  C/I  should be around 0.15, 
well below  1/  .  2
  13than 2 the effect of  x  on the fraction of pledgeable income that depends on the stochastic 
component of the project’s outcome dominates the effect of  x  on the equity multiplier. 
Equation (5) shows that the efficiency of the bankruptcy procedure (  ) reduces credit 
sensitivity to the cycle when the leverage level is low (smaller than  
1
2 1  
C,x ). It is 
important to note that, if the legal protection reduces credit sensitivity, a better bankruptcy 
procedure does too. Finally we should mention, as expected, that the effect of legal protection on 
credit sensitivity increases as the residual value of investment rises ( IL ). This result implies that 
industries with more tangible assets should observe a larger fall in their credit volatility after an 
improvement in legal protection. Braun and Larrain (2003) find evidence in favor of this result. 
Summarizing, the intuition of the model is straightforward. The main point of this framework is 
that the expected income that can be pledged to lenders without jeopardizing the entrepreneur’s 
incentives to work (pledgeable income) increases with creditor protection. Poor creditor 
protection materializes during bankruptcy.
16 In case of success firms repay their debt, but in the 
case of failure the creditor only collects a fraction of the residual value of the firm. This fraction 
increases with creditor rights and contract enforceability. Therefore, during recessions, when the 
likelihood of bankruptcy is high, the expected pledgeable income of firms falls more in countries 
with low credit protection, and in response credit is tightened more, increasing their credit 
growth volatility. In the following sections we test this implication econometrically using cross-
country time-varying data. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
 
In this section we provide a framework to test the main hypothesis of this paper, namely that the 
protection of creditor rights ( x ), and the efficiency with which they are enforced (  ), 
determines the way in which credit adjusts to shocks. Our approach consists of exploiting the 
differential response of countries with different degrees of creditor protection to shocks that 
reflect changes in the profitability of projects and therefore in the probability of bankruptcy (   
in the above conceptual framework). 
                                                 
16 In fact, if the probability of success of projects (hence the probability of debt repudiation) is zero, then weak 
creditor protection will have no impact on credit fluctuations. 
  14The dependent variable of our study is the yearly change in real credit in each of the 137 
countries included in our sample, during the period 1990-2003.
17 The source data for our 
dependent variable is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, line 22d, 
corresponding to credit provided to the private sector by the financial system.
18 We deflate this 
measure of credit using the consumer price index (line 64 from the same source) to obtain a 
measure of credit in real terms, and take first differences of the logarithm of this variable. 
The purpose of our study is to identify how real credit responds to an exogenous shock to 
the quality of projects (an exogenous change on the probability of success of projects -    in our 
model) under different institutional setups. For such purpose, a crucial aspect of this paper is to 
obtain an adequate proxy of the shock. A key characteristic of such a proxy is that it should not 
be endogenous to the behavior of real credit. This rules out straightforward measures such as 
GDP growth for example, given that credit and GDP are simultaneously determined.
19 In order to 
obtain an exogenous measure of shocks, we construct an external shock variable based on the 
GDP growth rate the trading partners of any given country, weighted by exports over the source 







where  ex   is the external shock to country i at time t,   t.shockit sij,t1  is the share of exports 
from country i to country j in  t  ,
20    1 S   is the average share of exports to GDP in country   i i  
during the sample period,
21 and  gjt  is the growth rate of real GDP of country j at time t. The 
source data for  sij  is the Direction of Trade Statistics database of the International Monetary 
                                                 
17 The sample period is restricted to the 1990s and onward, since the institutional data that will be described below, 
is only available for the this period. 
18 For countries that adopted the Euro in 1999 we sum to line 22d.f line 22zw. 
19 See for example Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000). 
20 Given  j  and  t , the sum of  sij,t1   over  j  is equal to 1. 
 
21We use the average share of exports on GDP to avoid fluctuation in this variables related with changes in the 
nominal exchange rate which is endogenous. Note that in the case of  sij,t1   country  i’s exchange rate movements 
cancel out. 
  15Fund, and for  S   and GDP growth rates is the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
database. 
i
The relevance of the shock measure is summarized in Table 1, where we show a strong 
correlation between the external shock and the real growth rate of GDP. Column 1 shows that, 
controlling for country and year fixed effects, the external shock measure is strongly and 
significantly correlated to the real GDP growth rate of the countries in our sample. Column 2, 
confirms that this correlation remains significant even when controlling for the level of 
development measured by GDP per capita (interaction). Finally, columns 3 and 4 show that the 
correlation remains significant and the regression coefficient remains stable when splitting the 
sample between developing and industrialized countries. Overall, our measure of external shock 
appears to be a good predictor of economic activity. 
Using this external shock measure we estimate regressions of the following type: 
 
Creditit  1ext.shockit  2ext.shockit  legal_protectioni  DTt  i  it  
 
where DT are year dummies included to control for any temporal fixed effects,     are country 
fixed effects introduced to control for country specific trends and to ensure that pooling of time 
series observations for an individual country with cross-sectional observations across countries 
does not generate spurious statistical significance, and  
i
le   is a set of variables 
that proxy the legal protection of creditors as well as the way regulations are enforced ( 
gal_protectioni
  and/or  
x  in our conceptual framework). As a proxy for legal protection ( x ) we use the measure of 
Creditor Rights (CR) constructed initially by La Porta et al. (1998), and for enforcement (  ) we 
use Rule of Law (RL), Days to enforce a Contract (CE), Total Duration of the Procedure (TD) 
and Efficiency of the Judiciary (EJ). We also use two variables to proxy for de jure creditor 
protection and enforcement at the same time ( x   ): Effective Creditor Rights (ECR) and 
Common Law Origin (CL). The definitions and sources of the legal protection proxies are the 
following: 
Creditor Rights (CR): We use the Djankov et al. (2004) index of creditor rights. This measure, 
based on La Porta et al. (1998), measures the degree to which secured creditors are protected 
during bankruptcy procedures. The index ranges from 0 to 4, where a higher number indicates 
  16greater creditor protection. A score of one is assigned when each of the following rights are 
defined in laws and regulations: i) there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum 
dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization; ii) secured creditors are able to seize their 
collateral after the reorganization petition is approved (no “automatic stay” or “asset freeze.”); 
iii) secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and iv) if 
management does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization. CR is used as a proxy for  x  in our model. 
Rule of Law (RL): We use the Kaufmann et al. (2003) measure of the rule of law. RL includes 
several indicators that measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. We use RL serves as a proxy 
of  .  in the model 
Days to enforce a Contract (CE): CE measures the number of days to resolve a payment dispute 
through courts according to Djankov et al. (2004). The data is developed analyzing a standard 
case across several countries. In particular the authors study the number of calendar days 
required to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50 percent of the country's GDP. This 
variable is also used as a proxy of   . 
Total Duration of the Procedure (TD): TD measures the duration in days of a process to collect a 
bounced check. The source of the data is Djankov et al. (2004) and, as above, it is also used as a 
proxy of efficiency in our model. 
Efficiency of the Judiciary (EJ): EJ is an assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the judicial 
system produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corp. as reported by 
La Porta et al. (1998). As above, we use this variable as a proxy of      .
Effective Creditor Rights (ECR): We develop a summary measure for both regulations and the 
quality of their enforcement that we label Effective Creditor Rights (ECR). ECR takes into 
account that weak law enforcement can diminish the quality of regulations. ECR is the product 
of CR and RL. Both of these are normalized between zero and one, in such a way that ECR also 
fluctuates within this range. A higher value indicates higher creditor protection. This summary 
measure proxies for both    and  x  simultaneously. 
  17Common Law (CL): We use the legal origin of each country's legal code to proxy both for better 
creditor protection and greater law enforcement. CL is a dummy that takes a value of 1 when 
countries have a common law legal tradition and 0 otherwise. As shown by La Porta et al. 
(1998), among many others, a common law traditional is an adequate instrument for better 
creditor rights and law enforcement. As ECR, CL also proxies simultaneously for    and  x  
simultaneously. The source of this data is Djankov et al. (2004). 
Appendix 1 reports the average values and basic descriptive statistics at an aggregate 
level and at a country level. It also reports the cross correlation matrix of the institutional 
regressors.
22 Table 2 reports a first inspection of the data under various classifications in terms of 
the effects of creditor protection on credit volatility measured as the standard deviation of credit 
growth during 1990-2003. 
In each panel of Table 2 the sample is divided by the differences in the institutional and 
legal characteristics described above, and the average and median values of the standard 
deviation of credit for the observations of the countries in each group. In the first panel the 
sample is divided between countries with high and low creditor rights (de jure credit protection: 
x ). Countries with high are those in which the creditor rights index is greater than 2 and 
countries with low creditor rights are defined as those where the creditor rights index is lower 
than 2.
23 The first column reports the number of countries classified in each category. The second 
column reports the average real credit volatility for the countries in each group, and the third 
column reports the median value. Using these statistics, we report the difference between the 
average and median values in each group and below we report the p-value of a statistical test 
under the null hypothesis that the difference in the means and medians is zero. We report similar 
statistics using each of the legal/institutional proxies mentioned above. In such exercises we 
define high and low as being above or below the median of the indicator. 
Each of the sample separations suggests a similar story. Countries where the indicators 
favor greater creditor protection or greater efficiency and enforcement of regulations tend to 
exhibit lower standard deviations of the growth rate of credit (i.e., credit tends to be less 
volatile). For our measure of de jure creditor protection (CR and  x  in the model) we observe 
that the median value of the standard deviation of credit is 14.4 percent for countries with weak 
                                                 
22For a detail description of the institutional variables see Djankov et al (2004). 
  18creditor rights and only 9.6 percent for countries with good de jure creditor protection. The 
difference is 4.8 percentage points and is significant at the 5 percent significance level. 
Comparing the mean value in each group the difference is 2.6 percentage points and is 
significant at the 13 percent significance level. 
Focusing on proxies for enforcement, we find that for each of our four proxies for    the 
difference in credit volatility between countries with high and low enforcement is negative and 
statistically significant at conventional levels (in all case but one at 1 percent). This is the case 
when we compare either the mean or the median level between groups. Finally, when focusing 
on our two variables that proxy both creditor rights and enforcement (ECR and CL), we find that 
countries with high de facto creditor protection present lower credit volatility. The magnitude of 
the difference in the measure of credit volatility between groups goes from 3 percentage points 
when we compare the mean level using CL (significant at 3 percent) to 6 percentage points in the 
case of ECR using the median values within groups (significant at 1 percent). In all cases the 
effect appears to be economically significant. For example, in the case of common law as 
opposed to non-common law countries, these numbers suggest that the volatility of credit is 26 
percent higher in countries with non-common law legal origin, that is, rephrasing La Porta et al., 
in countries where the legal tradition does not favor creditor protection. These numbers, though, 
need to be interpreted cautiously, since they do not control for the size of the shocks faced by the 




Equations (4) and (5) suggest that credit fluctuations are smoother in countries with higher 
creditor protection than in those with low protection. To test the validity of this proposition, we 
construct a panel in which we gather information for the 1990-2003 period for a broad set of 
countries across the world. We estimate the empirical model described in equation (1) using a 
panel that is confined to the 1990s. This is done in order to avoid the impact of possible changes 
in regulation, which we cannot capture due to the fact that most of the legal data are collected in 
only one period. Our theory suggests that     and   1  0   , that is, credit should react 
positively to shocks, but the magnitude of that reaction diminishes as creditor rights improve. 
2  0
                                                                                                                                                             
23 In this exercise we exclude countries that have the median level of creditor rights (2). 
  19Table 3 reports a first set of results in which we include each of the legal/institutional proxies 
separately in each regression. Column 1 reports the result using creditor rights as our proxy for 
de jure protection ( x ). Column 2 uses rule of law as proxy for contract enforceability, and 
Columns 3 and 4 use duration measures. In such cases we use the negative of the log of the 
number of days that the procedures last, in order to maintain the same interpretation as the other 
indexes (i.e., higher values mean greater creditor protection) or greater efficiency in enforcing 
creditor protections. Column 5 reports results using the efficiency of the judiciary measure, while 
columns 6 and 7 use the effective creditor rights index and common law legal origin dummy, 
respectively. 
The sample of countries in each column is dictated by data availability. All specifications 
include year fixed effects as well as country fixed effects. In further specifications we restrict the 
data set to the number of country-year observations where data on all variables are available, 
except for the efficiency of the judiciary, for which there is little country coverage. In column 8 
we report the same regression as in column 7, but restricting the sample to that dataset. 
The results reported in Table 3 are in line with the prediction of the theoretical 
framework. Better creditor protection and better enforcement reduce the impact of shocks on 
credit. All regressions reported in columns 1-8 show negative and significant coefficients on the 
interaction of the shock measure and the creditor protection proxies. Results using contract 
enforcement, efficiency of the judiciary, effective creditor rights, and the common law dummy 
are significant at the 1 percent level. When using rule of law, and total duration the estimated 
coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level, and when using creditor rights they are 
significant at the 10 percent level. These results are not only statistically significant, but their 
economic magnitude is also relevant. Moving from a creditor rights index equal to 2 (50th 
percentile) to one equal to 3 (75th percentile) reduces the coefficient on the external shock by 
nearly 1.9 points, a 30 percent decline in credit growth elasticity with respect to external shocks. 
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the rule of law index, for example, reduces the 
coefficient on the external shock by nearly 1.5 points. If a negative shock hits the economy, the 
contraction of credit will be 49 percent lower in a country that is one standard deviation ahead of 
a country with average rule of law that is hit by an identical shock. We find similar results for 
our duration measures (CE and TD). Finally, in countries with a common law legal origin the 
impact on credit growth of an external shock is between 75 percent and 79 percent lower than in 
  20a non-common law country, depending on the sample of countries used in the regression 
analysis. 
Our framework suggests that there is a differential role for the impact of variables that 
reflect better legal protections and those measuring better enforcement. Determining whether the 
proxies measure exclusively one or the other is not straightforward. Nonetheless, we try to assess 
the impact of each separately by simultaneously including a variable exclusively related to the 
content of regulations such as the creditor rights index and other variables that capture mostly the 
efficiency of the legal process, such as the rule of law, the duration of contract enforcement and 
of legal procedures, and the efficiency of the judiciary. These results are reported in Table 4. 
Each column reports results including the legal protection variable (creditor rights) and each of 
the efficiency of enforcement variables. The p-value of an f-test to test for joint significance of 
the regulatory and the enforcement variables is reported at the bottom of the table. In all cases, 
both interactive terms are jointly significant and, in all cases except the one using efficiency of 
the judiciary, where the sample is considerably smaller, both coefficients are individually 
significant. This suggests, as predicted by our theoretical framework, that both de jure creditor 
protection (CR :   x  in the model) and its enforcement reduce credit volatility. As before, the 
results are not only statistically but are also economically significant. Column 1 suggests that, 
other things equal, a one standard deviation increase away from the mean in the creditor rights 
index reduces the impact of a shock by 40 percent, while a one standard deviation increase in 
rule of law reduces it by 55 percent. 
A concern about the results above is that they may be driven by differences in economic 
development and that economic development is being proxied for by the legal/institutional 
variables considered in the study. In order to account for this, in Table 5 we control for economic 
development in two different ways. In columns 1-6 we include an additional interaction between 
the shocks measure and income per capita.
24 In such cases, the coefficients estimated for the 
interactions between the creditor protections and the shock measure capture the differential 
impact of regulations beyond the differential impact due to different levels of economic 
development. In columns 7-12 we replace income per capita for dummies reflecting the income 
level of the country following World Bank classification: High (INC10), Medium High (INC21 - 
omitted group), Medium Low (INC22) and Low income countries (INC33). The results remain 
  21unchanged. Common law countries, for example, are between 40 percent and 50 percent less 
sensitive to an external shock than non-common law countries, depending on the specification. 
Another way of dealing with the concern that the results reflect levels of development 
rather than legal and institutional differences is by splitting the sample. In Table 6 we report the 
same results as above, but restrict the sample to developing countries (developed countries are 
defined using the World Bank classification).
25 While the individual significance of the creditor 
rights index falls in some of the specifications, the joint significance of the creditor rights 
measure and any of the efficiency of enforcement variables remains.
26 The significance of the 
effective creditor rights measure and of the common law dummy remains at the 1 percent level. 
The order of magnitude remains similar to the one above. A one standard deviation increase in 
creditor rights away from the average country reduces the impact of a shock by 36 percent, while 
a one standard deviation increase in the rule of law reduces the impact of a shock by 60 percent. 
As in Table 3, countries with high “effective” creditor rights and common law countries appear 
to be significantly less affected by shocks than non-common law countries. Column (5) shows 
that, as for the whole sample (Table 3), for a country in the 80th percentile in terms of effective 
creditor rights the impact of a shock is around 50 percent lower than for a country in the 20th 
percentile. The same is true in column 7, where we also control for the interaction of GDP per 
capita and the external shock. Column 6 shows that in common law countries the impact of a 
shock is around 80 percent lower than in non-common law countries. This percentage falls to 50 
percent once we control for the interaction of GDP per capita and the external shock in Column 
8. These last two results are almost identical to the ones obtained using the whole sample (Tables 




This paper studies the relationship between creditor protection and credit cycle. In particular it 
tests the idea that weak creditor protection becomes relevant during bankruptcy. When firms are 
unsuccessful and unable to repay their debts, creditors collect only a fraction of the residual 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 Income per capita is measured as the average of GDP per capita (in logs) during the sample period. 
25 In our sample the countries defined as developed are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States. 
26 Given the small number of developing countries for which we have information for EJ, we do not stress the results 
in column 4. 
  22value of the firm. This fraction increases with creditor rights and contract enforceability. 
Therefore, during recessions, when the likelihood of bankruptcy increases, the expected 
pledgeable income of firms falls more in institutional environments characterized by low creditor 
protection; in response credit will be tightened more during these periods, increasing credit 
growth volatility. In other words, the contraction in credit during the negative phase of the 
business cycle should be greater in economies where creditor protection is weaker. 
We motivate the previous idea in a framework a la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) that 
explains the relationship between creditor protection, credit market breadth and the credit cycle. 
We test the basic implications of the model using an updated data set on legal determinants of 
finance in a panel of data of aggregate credit growth for a sample of up to 139 countries during 
the period 1990-2003. We find support for the claim that better legal protections significantly 
reduce credit volatility. We show that the impact of exogenous shocks on credit markets is larger 
in institutional environments characterized by poor creditor protection. The results are not only 
statistically but also economically significant. In common law countries, for example, which are 
characterized by high creditor protection and good contract enforcement, the elasticity of credit 
with respect to external shocks is half the level observed in other nations. These results are 
robust to alternative measures of creditor protection, the inclusion of variables that reflect 
different stages of economic development, the restriction of our sample to only developing 
countries, and alternative measures of shocks. Poor creditor protection induces an overreaction of 
credit markets to exogenous shocks. Overall, we find strong evidence on the role played by 
explicit creditor rights regulations and the efficiency of their enforcement in promoting stability 
in credit markets. 
 
  23Table 1. Real GDP Growth and External Shock 
 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dlgdp dlgdp dlgdp dlgdp
Ext.Shock 1.268 1.107 1.566 1.202
(0.191)*** (0.245)*** (0.507)*** (0.201)***
Ext.Shock * GDPpc 0.178
(0.116)
Observations 1627 1615 286 1341
Number of Countries 137 136 23 114
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2198 0.2181 0.5417 0.2031
Sample All All IND DEV
Standard errors in parentheses









Low Creditor Rights 47 0.144 0.144
High Creditor Rights 37 0.118 0.096
Difference 0.026 0.048
P value 0.13 0.05
Low Rule of Law 70 0.172 0.157
High Rule of Law 67 0.089 0.073
Difference 0.083 0.084
P value 0.00 0.00
High Duration of Contract Enforcement 54 0.157 0.144
Low Duration of Contract Enforcement 55 0.118 0.103
Difference 0.039 0.041
P value 0.01 0.01
High Total Duration of Procedure 45 0.128 0.126
Low Total Duration of Procedure 45 0.103 0.084
Difference 0.024 0.042
P value 0.11 0.00
Low Efficiency of the Judiciary 24 0.132 0.138
High Efficiency of the Judiciary 23 0.059 0.038
Difference 0.073 0.099
P value 0.00 0.00
Low Effective Creditor Rights 54 0.158 0.145
High Effective Creditor Rights 55 0.118 0.083
Difference 0.040 0.062
P value 0.01 0.00
Non Common Law 87 0.142 0.130
Common Law 50 0.113 0.084
Difference 0.029 0.046
P value 0.03 0.00
Note: Annual log-changes standard deviation are computed for the period 1990-2003
We drop the 2 percent extreme values of real credit growth and country-year observations with inflation above 200%. 
Low creditor rights countries are defined as countries with index values 0 or 1, and high with values 3 or 4.
For the rest of the variables, high and low refer to above and below the sample median.   
  24Table 3. Baseline Result 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ext.Shock 5.984 3.682 6.246 4.159 5.641 13.002 5.104 9.677
(1.527)*** (1.141)*** (1.408)*** (1.021)*** (1.411)*** (2.217)*** (1.423)*** (1.747)***
Ext.Shock * CR -1.861
(0.961)*
Ext.Shock * RL -1.526
(0.761)**
Ext.Shock * CE -2.754
(1.024)***
Ext.Shock * TD -1.609
(0.801)**
Ext.Shock * EJ -1.838
(0.598)***
Ext.Shock * ECR -22.654
(4.635)***
Ext.Shock * CL -4.036 -7.196
(1.423)*** (1.866)***
Observations 1298 1629 1298 1089 577 952 1629 952
Number of Countries 109 137 109 90 47 79 137 79
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.1938 0.1896 0.1946 0.2009 0.2331 0.2268 0.1918 0.2199
Sample 1990-2003
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
Table 4: Results Controlling For Creditor Rights and Enforcement Measures 
Simultaneously 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ext.Shock 10.178 9.883 9.395 7.162
(1.627)*** (1.548)*** (1.509)*** (1.642)***
Ext.Shock * CR -2.306 -2.943 -2.586 -1.627
(0.854)*** (0.818)*** (0.872)*** (1.093)
Ext.Shock * RL -3.230
(0.967)***
Ext.Shock * CE -3.355
(0.912)***
Ext.Shock * TD -3.179
(1.098)***
Ext.Shock * EJ -1.606
(0.643)**
Observations 952 952 952 577
Number of Countries 79 79 79 47
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2290 0.2266 0.2251 0.2366
F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013
Sample 1990-2003
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
  25Table 5. Results Controlling For Level of Development 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ext.Shock 9.833 10.328 10.352 7.554 13.011 11.484 11.124 13.091 12.719 8.711 15.545 13.279
(1.615)*** (1.692)*** (1.705)*** (2.040)*** (2.162)*** (1.932)*** (2.330)*** (2.482)*** (2.510)*** (5.528) (2.728)*** (2.520)***
Ext.Shock * CR -2.441 -2.607 -2.179 -1.703 -2.196 -2.285 -1.798 -1.779
(0.862)*** (0.869)*** (0.884)** (1.092) (0.876)** (0.870)*** (0.906)** (1.021)*
Ext.Shock * RL -5.500 -6.702
(2.720)** (2.100)***
Ext.Shock * CE -2.409 -3.742
(1.079)** (1.039)***
Ext.Shock * TD -2.237 -2.762
(1.048)** (1.004)***
Ext.Shock * EJ -1.458 -1.400
(0.877)* (0.953)
Ext.Shock * ECR -22.738 -24.860
(6.450)*** (5.930)***
Ext.Shock * CL -5.617 -5.180
(1.821)*** (1.899)***
Ext.Shock * GDPpc 1.907 -0.982 -1.368 -0.293 0.015 -1.964
(2.048) (0.898) (0.742)* (1.157) (0.995) (0.713)***
Ext.Shock * INC10 6.000 -4.693 -3.680 1.032 -5.188 -1.349
(13.004) (4.488) (4.426) (8.863) (4.455) (4.510)
Ext.Shock * INC22 -4.652 -6.446 -5.867 -2.777 -4.433 -5.690
(7.134) (2.988)** (2.968)** (6.492) (2.949) (3.097)*
Ext.Shock * INC33 -0.411 -3.549 -5.166 -1.606 -1.128 -6.384
(7.684) (2.563) (2.470)** (6.964) (2.901) (2.791)**
Observations 952 952 952 577 952 952 577 952 952 577 952 952
Number of Countries 79 79 79 47 79 79 79 79 79 47 79 79
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2301 0.2277 0.2280 0.2367 0.2268 0.2277 0.2480 0.2322 0.2306 0.2377 0.2308 0.2282
F test 0.0030 0.0023 0.0012 0.0160 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0427
Sample All Countries 1990-2003 All Countries 1990-2003
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6. Results for Developing Country Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Ext.Shock 10.085 10.371 10.103 3.795 13.544 10.522 13.412 11.714
(1.771)*** (1.873)*** (1.881)*** (2.376) (2.541)*** (2.149)*** (3.269)*** (2.156)***
Ext.Shock * CR -1.862 -3.332 -3.010 0.294
(1.138) (1.011)*** (1.052)*** (1.790)
Ext.Shock * RL -3.923
(1.093)***
Ext.Shock * CE -3.633
(0.996)***
Ext.Shock * TD -3.562
(1.232)***
Ext.Shock * EJ -1.809
(0.741)**
Ext.Shock * ECR -24.606 -23.730
(5.188)*** (14.413)*
Ext.Shock * CL -8.499 -5.572
(2.220)*** (2.486)**
Ext.Shock * GDPpc -0.142 -2.377
(2.147) (0.894)***
Observations 317 692 692 317 692 692 692 692
Number of Countries 58 58 58 26 58 58 58 58
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2474 0.2171 0.2125 0.2410 0.2139 0.2086 0.2139 0.2170
F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0310
Sample Developing 1990-2003
Standard errors in parentheses




  27Figure 1. Financial Markets and Creditor Protection 
 
                      (a) Credit Market  Development and Legal Protection
                      (b) Credit Market Volatility and Legal Protection
Notes: Low and high effective creditor rights indicates below or above the median of effective creditor rights respectively. Effective creditor rights is 
the product of the Creditor Rights Index and Rule of Law. *,**, and *** indicates that the difference between the indicators across groups of 
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  28Appendix 1 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Creditor Rights (CR) 1298 1.80 1.18 0 4
Rule of Law (RL) 1629 0.15 0.94 -1.35 2.14
Days to enforce a Contract (CE) 1298 380 233 27 1459
Total Duration of the Procedure (TD) 1089 237 175 7 1003
Efficiency of the Judiciary (EJ) 577 7.68 2.07 2.50 10.00
Effective Creditor Rights (ECR) 1298 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.68
Common Law 1629 0.38 0.49 0 1
Real Credit Growth 1629 0.05 0.16 -0.95 1.48
Shock 1629 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.10
Source: Djankov et al (2003), Djankov et al (2004), Kaufmann et al (2003), IFS/IMF and WDI/WB.
Note: Creditor Rights is the average value for the 1990s. Rule of Law is the average for 1996-1998-2000-2002. 






Table A2. Correlation Matrix 
 
CR RL CE TD EJ CL
CR Corr. 1.00
Obs. 109
RL Corr. 0.26* 1.00
Obs. 109 137
CE Corr. 0.17* 0.52* 1.00
Obs. 109 109 109
TD Corr. 0.12 0.18* 0.74* 1.00
Obs. 79 90 79 90
EJ Corr. 0.23 0.76* 0.52* 0.38* 1.00
Obs. 47 47 47 47 47
CL Corr. 0.30* 0.06 0.15 0.29* 0.19 1.00
Obs. 109 137 109 90 47 137
Notes: Pairwise correlations are reported. One observation per country. CE and TD are in log. * significant at 10%.  
 
 
  29Table A3. Country-Specific Data 
 
Country CR RL CE TD EJ ECR CL Std.Dev.
Real.Cred.Growth
Argentina 1.0 -0.018 520 300 6 0.067 0 0.144
Algeria 1.0 -0.684 407               0.034 0 0.195
Armenia 2.1 -0.442 195               0.097 0 0.239
Australia 3.0 1.882 157 319.5 10 0.490 1 0.031
Austria 3.0 1.974 374 434 9.5 0.504 0 0.027
Bahrain 0.841 368               1 0.073
Bangladesh 2.0 -0.713 365 270               0.065 1 0.079
Barbados 0.730 111               1 0.077
Belgium 2.0 1.466 112 120 9.5 0.285 0 0.024
Belize 0.277 60               1 0.051
Benin 0.0 -0.324 570               0.000 0 0.212
Bhutan -0.441               1 0.155
Bolivia 2.0 -0.527 591 464               0.084 0 0.130
Botswana 3.0 0.729 154 77               0.315 1 0.141
Brazil 1.0 -0.207 566 180 5.75 0.058 0 0.136
Bulgaria 2.0 -0.105 440 410               0.126 0 0.383
Burkina Faso 0.0 -0.594 458               0.000 0 0.236
Burundi 1.0 -0.862 512               0.025 0 0.185
Cameroon 0.0 -1.108 585               0.000 0 0.133
Canada 1.1 1.864 346 421 9.25 0.186 1 0.038
Cape Verde 0.357               0 0.076
Central African Rep. 0.0 -0.639 660               0.000 0 0.149
Chad 0.0 -0.724 526               0.000 0 0.143
Chile 2.0 1.251 305 200 7.25 0.263 0 0.064
Colombia 0.0 -0.631 363 527 7.25 0.000 0 0.126
Congo, Rep. 0.0 -1.203 560               0.000 0 0.143
Costa Rica 1.0 0.720 550 370               0.105 0 0.145
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0 -0.736 525 150               0.000 0 0.098
Croatia 3.0 -0.092 415 330               0.191 0 0.222
Cyprus 0.804 360               1 0.030
Czech Republic 3.0 0.625 300 270               0.300 0 0.120
Denmark 3.0 1.942 83 83 10 0.499 0 0.084
Dominica -0.007               1 0.054
Dominican Republic 2.0 -0.305 580 215               0.106 0 0.129
Ecuador 0.0 -0.579 388 332.5 6.25 0.000 0 0.170
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.0 0.165 410 202 6.5 0.153 0 0.101
El Salvador 3.0 -0.401 275 60               0.144 0 0.111
Estonia 0.580 305               0 0.127
Ethiopia 3.0 -0.356 420               0.151 0 0.249
Fiji -0.347               1 0.095
Finland 1.0 2.014 240 240 10 0.170 0 0.070
France 0.0 1.440 75 181 8 0.000 0 0.044
Gabon -0.405               0 0.175
Gambia, The -0.203               1 0.204
Germany 3.0 1.814 184 154 9 0.480 0 0.037  
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Country CR RL CE TD EJ ECR CL Std.Dev.
Real.Cred.Growth
Ghana 1.0 -0.132 200 90               0.062 1 0.195
Greece 1.0 0.721 151 315 7 0.105 0 0.103
Grenada 0.303 128               1 0.088
Guatemala 1.0 -0.734 1459 220               0.031 0 0.127
Guinea-Bissau -1.286               0 0.268
Haiti 2.0 -1.355 368               0.000 0 0.108
Honduras 2.0 -0.785 545 225               0.058 0 0.110
Hong Kong, China 4.0 1.557 211 61 10 0.588 1 0.082
Hungary 1.0 0.771 365 365               0.107 0 0.160
Iceland 1.871 251               0 0.132
India 2.2 0.110 425 106 8 0.164 1 0.058
Indonesia 2.6 -0.753 570 225 2.5 0.078 0 0.139
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.0 -0.572 545               0.079 0 0.128
Ireland 1.0 1.743 217 130 8.75 0.156 1 0.149
Israel 3.4 1.046 585 315 10 0.415 1 0.036
Italy 2.0 0.901 1390 645 6.75 0.228 0 0.061
Jamaica 2.0 -0.251 202 202               0.111 1 0.323
Japan 2.5 1.594 60 60 10 0.372 0 0.026
Kazakhstan 1.4 -0.795 400 120               0.040 0 0.288
Kenya 4.0 -0.956 360 255 5.75 0.080 1 0.159
Korea, Rep. 3.0 0.763 75 75 6 0.321 0 0.049
Kuwait 3.0 0.919 390 357               0.344 0 0.108
Lao PDR 0.0 -1.119 443               0.000 0 0.464
Latvia 3.0 0.229 189 188.5               0.240 0 0.187
Lesotho 1.0 -0.144 285               0.061 1 0.167
Lithuania 1.6 0.179 154 150               0.123 0 0.157
Macedonia, FYR 3.0 -0.409 509               0.143 0 0.284
Madagascar 2.0 -0.673 280               0.069 0 0.116
Malawi 2.7 -0.393 277 108               0.132 1 0.268
Malaysia 3.0 0.673 300 90 9 0.307 1 0.083
Mali 0.0 -0.644 340               0.000 0 0.151
Malta 0.613 545               0 0.048
Mauritania 1.0 -0.478 410               0.044 0 0.145
Mauritius 0.827               0 0.065
Mexico 0.0 -0.275 421 283 6 0.000 0 0.213
Mongolia 2.0 0.256 314               0.163 0 0.315
Morocco 1.0 0.273 240 192               0.082 0 0.138
Mozambique 2.0 -0.906 580 540               0.045 0 0.182
Myanmar -1.275               0 0.217
Namibia 2.0 0.758 270 117.5               0.213 1 0.069
Nepal 2.0 -0.360 350               0.100 1 0.081
Netherlands 3.0 1.893 48 39 10 0.492 0 0.033
New Zealand 4.0 1.989 50 60 10 0.675 1 0.032
Nicaragua 4.0 -0.756 155               0.121 0 0.256
Niger 1.1 -0.888 330               0.027 0 0.228  
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Country CR RL CE TD EJ ECR CL Std.Dev.
Real.Cred.Growth
Nigeria 4.0 -1.219 730 241 7.25 0.027 1 0.201
Norway 2.0 2.019 87 87 10 0.341 0 0.061
Oman 0.0 1.086 455               0.000 0 0.093
Pakistan 1.0 -0.617 395 365 5 0.037 1 0.040
Panama 4.0 0.042 355 197               0.282 0 0.092
Papua New Guinea 1.0 -0.454 295               0.045 1 0.129
Paraguay 1.0 -0.802 285 222               0.028 0 0.108
Peru 0.0 -0.442 441 441 6.75 0.000 0 0.146
Philippines 1.0 -0.294 380 164 4.75 0.054 0 0.164
Poland 2.9 0.556 1000 1000               0.276 0 0.096
Portugal 1.0 1.244 320 420 5.5 0.131 0 0.073
Rwanda 1.0 -0.803 395               0.028 0 0.191
Saudi Arabia 1.1 0.656 360               0.116 1 0.076
Senegal 0.0 -0.237 485 335               0.000 0 0.163
Seychelles -0.055               0 0.090
Sierra Leone 2.0 -0.935 305               0.042 1 0.250
Singapore 3.0 2.008 69 46.5 10 0.509 1 0.070
Slovak Republic 2.0 0.224 565               0.159 0 0.201
Slovenia 3.0 0.821 1003 1003               0.329 0 0.067
Solomon Islands -0.768               1 0.124
South Africa 3.0 0.247 277 84 6 0.243 1 0.051
Spain 2.0 1.239 169 147 6.25 0.262 0 0.058
Sri Lanka 2.0 0.049 440 440 7 0.142 1 0.316
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.114               1 0.061
St. Lucia 0.114               1 0.044
St. Vincent/Grenadines 0.220 35               1 0.053
Sudan -1.303               1 0.077
Suriname -0.624               0 0.212
Swaziland -0.145 40               1 0.104
Sweden 1.4 1.921 208 190 10 0.236 0 0.114
Switzerland 1.0 2.141 170 223.5 10 0.176 0 0.025
Syrian Arab Republic 3.0 -0.384 672               0.147 0 0.070
Tanzania 2.0 -0.432 242 127               0.093 1 0.210
Thailand 2.6 0.385 390 210 3.25 0.232 1 0.149
Togo 0.0 -0.877 535               0.000 0 0.116
Tonga -0.653               1 0.102
Trinidad and Tobago 0.370 194               1 0.087
Tunisia 0.0 0.295 27 7               0.000 0 0.055
Turkey 2.0 0.056 330 105 4 0.142 0 0.185
Uganda 2.0 -0.616 209 99               0.075 1 0.139
United Kingdom 4.0 1.883 288 101 10 0.654 1 0.038
United States 1.0 1.750 250 54 10 0.157 1 0.030
Uruguay 2.1 0.537 620 360 6.5 0.205 0 0.098
Vanuatu -0.432               1 0.085
Venezuela, RB 3.0 -0.782 445 360 6.5 0.087 0 0.220
Zambia 1.0 -0.423 274 188               0.047 1 0.209
Zimbabwe 4 -0.573 350 197 7.5 0.158 1 0.165
Source: Djankov et al (2003), Djankov et al (2004), Kaufmann et al (2003), La Porta et al (1998) and IFS/IMF
Note: Rule of Law is the average for 1996-1998-2000-2002. For the empirical analysis we use the log value of CE and TD.  
 
  32References 
 
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton. 1992. “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting.” 
Review of Economic Studies 59(3): 473-94 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and R. Levine. 2003. “Law, Endowments, and Finance.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 70: 137-181. 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and V. Maksimovic. 2003. “Financial and Legal Institutions and 
Firm Size.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2997. Washington, DC, United 
States: World Bank.  
----. 2004. “Financial and Legal Constraints to Firm Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?” Journal of 
Finance. Forthcoming 
Beck, T., R. Levine and N. Loayza. 2000. “Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and 
Causes.” Journal of Monetary Economics 46(1): 31-77 
Bernanke, B., and A. Blinder. 1998. “Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand.” American 
Economic Review 78: 435-439. 
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist. 1996. “The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to 
Quality.” Review of Economics and Statistics: 78: 1-15. 
----. 1999. “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework.” Handbook 
of Macroeconomics. Amsterdam; New York and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-
Holland, Volume 1C: 1341-93 
Braun, M., and B. Larrain. 2003. “Finance and the Business Cycle: International, Inter-Industry 
Evidence.” Cambridge, United States: Harvard University. Manuscript. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and V. Maksimovic. 1998. “Law, Finance, and Firm Growth.” Journal of 
Finance 53(6): 2107-37 
Djankov, S., C. McLiesh and A. Shleifer. 2004.  “Private Credit in 129 Countries.” Cambridge, 
United States: Harvard University. Manuscript. 
Fazzari, S., R.G. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen. 1988. “Financing Constraints and Corporate 
Investment.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 141-195. 
Galindo, A., and A. Micco. 2004. “Bank Credit to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: The 
Role of Creditor Protection.” Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American 
Development Bank, Research Department. Mimeographed document.  
  33Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist. 1994. “Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the Behavior of 
Small Manufacturing Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 309-340. 
Hart, O., J. Moore. 1994. “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4): 841-79. 
----.  1998. “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 113(1): 1-42. 
Hölmstrom, B., and J. Tirole. 1997. “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real 
Sector.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 663-91. 
----.  1998. “Private and Public Supply of Liquidity.” Journal of Political Economy 106: 1-40. 
Inter-American Development Bank. 2004.  Unlocking Credit: The Quest for Deep and Stable 
Bank Lending. Economic and Social Progress Report. Washington, DC, United States: 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
Johnson, S. et al. 2000. “Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis.”  Journal of 
Financial Economics 58(1-2): 141-86 
Kashyap, A.K., O.A. Lamont and J. Stein. 1994. “Credit Conditions and the Cyclical Behavior of 
Inventories.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 565-592. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi. 2003.  “Governance Matters III: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2002.” Policy Research Working Paper 3106. Washington, DC, 
United States: World Bank. . 
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore. 1997. “Credit Cycles.” Journal of Political Economy 105(2): 211-48. 
La Porta, R. et al. 1997. “Legal Determinants of External Finance.”  Journal of Finance 52(3): 
1131-1150. 
----. 1998. “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy 106(6): 1113-1155. 
Love, I. 2003. “Financial Development and Financing Constraints: International Evidence from 
the Structural Investment Model.” Review of Financial Studies 16(3): 765-91. 
Oliner, S., and G. Rudebusch. 1996. “Is There a Broad Credit Channel to Monetary Policy?” 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 1: 3-13. 
Sharpe, S.A. 1994.  “Financial Market Imperfections, Firm Leverage, and the Cyclicality of 
Employment.” American Economic Review 84: 1060-1074. 
  34Stein, J. 1998. “An Adverse Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with 
Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy.” Rand Journal of Economics 29: 
466-486. 
Townsend, R.M. 1979. “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State 
Verification.” Journal of Economic Theory 21(2): 265-93 
 
  35